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INTRODUCTION 
Since Gregor Mendel1 discovered the gene, scientists have 
sought to unravel the intricacies of life’s blueprint—the genetic 
code.2  Today, insights into molecular biology and genetic 
engineering3 fuel biotechnology, an industry promising to touch 
every aspect of human life.4  Already, biotechnology has enabled 
major advances in medical therapeutics and diagnostics, and has 
spawned complex new fields such as genomics5 and proteomics.6 
Given the major role of gene-based technologies in 
biotechnology, gene patents are among a biotechnology company’s 
most valuable assets.7  Patents are government issued grants providing 
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 1 See infra text accompanying notes 47-50 for a discussion of Mendel’s work. 
 2 See infra Part II for a discussion of the scientific discoveries that enabled the 
deciphering of the genetic code. 
 3 Genetic engineering involves the use of processes (i.e., genetic manipulation, 
genetic modification, genetic technology, recombinant DNA technology) to move 
genes from one organism to another, often to solve medical or agricultural 
problems, with the goal of creating organisms with novel genetic make-ups.  MICHAEL 
J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE? 1, 2 (1996). 
 4 Examples of biotechnology’s focus on genetics include the development of 
genetically engineered organisms that remove hazardous waste from the 
environment, the development of animals that make human products such as 
insulin, and the development of genetically engineered drugs for treating heart 
disease, cancer, AIDS, and strokes.  See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: 
HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD 15-24 (1998). 
 5 The goal of genomics is to study the functions and interactions of all genes in 
the genome.  See Alan Guttmacher & Francis Collins, Genomic Medicine: Genomic 
Medicine-A Primer, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1513 (2002). 
 6 Proteomics involves the study of proteins, their biological functions, and the 
mechanisms by which they interact.  HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH E. POWERS, IP 
STRATEGY: COMPLETE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLANNING, ACCESS, AND PROTECTION § 
4:21 (2002). 
 7 RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 37 (referring to genes as the “green gold” of 
biotechnology). 
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their owner the right to exclude others from “making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling [their] invention”8 for a period of twenty years 
from the date of filing.9  In offering protection, patents also create 
incentives.10  Barring exclusion, competitors could copy a patented 
invention and undersell the patent owner, who, unlike the 
competition, has incurred research and development costs.11  The 
right of exclusion, however, prevents competitors from “making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented invention.12  In so 
doing, the exclusionary right provides opportunity for economic 
recovery and gain, which in turn creates incentives to invest the time, 
effort, and money necessary for the creation of new and useful 
products.13 
The importance of obtaining patent protection for commercially 
valuable genes has created a race to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”).14  Given the pressure to file first, 
biotechnology companies often choose to file broad patent 
applications in the early stages of research, before they understand 
the commercial applications of their inventions.15  Biotechnologists 
defend these broad filings, arguing that limiting their patents to the 
“specific and narrow” lab results will make cost recovery an 
impossibility.16  Legal commentators, clinicians, and researchers, 
however, argue that gene patents have the real potential of 
undermining biomedical research, health care, and the free 
exchange of information among researchers.17  For instance, a gene 
patent holder may lawfully prevent the scientific community from 
conducting research or developing valuable therapeutic applications 
based on the patented gene’s DNA sequence.18  Even when the patent 
holder is willing to license the gene or DNA sequence, the cost of 
acquiring the license can be prohibitive.19 
This Comment explores the key role American patent law plays, 
 
 8 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001). 
 9 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). 
 10 CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF  PATENT LAW 70-76 (2d ed. 2001). 
 11 Id. at 69. 
 12 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001). 
 13 See CHISUM ET AL, supra note 10, at 70-76. 
 14 See RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 59. 
 15 ERIC S. GRACE, BIOTECHNOLOGY UNZIPPED: PROMISES AND REALITIES 204 (1997). 
 16 See id. 
 17 See infra Part IV for an in-depth examination of the policy issues surrounding 
the issuance of gene patents. 
 18 See Part IV.A. 
 19 See id. 
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and must continue to play, in preventing the ills associated with 
broad gene patents.  Part I offers a basic explanation of genes and 
their functions.  Part II provides an introduction to the biotechnology 
industry.  This section examines the history of biotechnology with an 
emphasis on current technology and the scientific goals of the 
industry.  Part III gives an overview of the American patent system.  
Part IV considers both the negative and positive implications of 
issuing gene-based patents.  Also, this section briefly discusses various 
options for lessening the negative effects of gene patents.  Part V 
suggests that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit adopt a biotechnology-specific application of the 
foreseeability standard articulated in Judge Rader’s concurrence in 
Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc. 20 Under this 
objective foreseeability-based limit on the doctrine of equivalents,21 
the patent applicant “has an obligation to draft claims capturing all 
reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention,”22 and may not 
rely on the doctrine of equivalents to capture “subject matter that the 
patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen,”23 but failed to claim.  
Judge Rader advocated the foreseeability standard as a general, 
rather than biotechnology-specific, patent law principle.24  This 
section, however, argues for a biotechnology-specific application of 
the foreseeability standard.25  It posits that applying a heightened, 
more restrictive version of the doctrine of equivalents in 
biotechnology cases will effectively limit gene patent scope, thereby 
promoting biotechnological progress.26 
 
I. THE GENE 
This Comment aspires to offer an in-depth examination of the 
challenges that gene patents pose, and the manner in which courts 
have and should continue to limit gene patent scope.  However, in 
order to appreciate a gene’s scientific value, gene patent case law, 
 
 20 285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (Rader, J., 
concurring) (agreeing with the court’s decision, but arguing that the court should 
have decided the issue under a foreseeability approach to the doctrine of 
equivalents). 
 21 See infra text accompanying notes 131-42 for a discussion of the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
 22 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 23 Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 24 See id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 25 See infra Part V. 
 26 See id. 
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and the philosophical questions surrounding gene patents, it is 
helpful to comprehend the structure and function of the gene itself. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid, also known as DNA, is the primary 
repository for genetic information in the human body.27  DNA is 
located on chromosomes,28 which are located in a cell’s nucleus.29  
Although it may be difficult to understand the function of DNA, 
“[its] structure is really quite simple.”30 
DNA, in its double helix form, resembles a twisted rope ladder.  
The rope element (a strand) is composed of alternating molecules of 
sugar and phosphate.31  Each step of the ladder is composed of a pair 
of bases (nucleotides) joined by chemical bonds.32  There are four 
such bases: G (guanine), T (thymine), C (cytosine) and A 
(adenine).33  The bases are complementary in that they always pair up 
the same way: A with T, and C with G.34  Thus, each step of the ladder 
is either an A-T, T-A, C-G or G-C.35  More importantly, the 
complementary nature of the bases means that the sequence of bases 
on one strand always complements the sequence along the other 
strand in the same way.36 
DNA’s incredible ability to store information lies in the bases, 
the arrangement of which makes up a gene.37  A useful way to 
visualize a gene is as follows: imagine splitting the ladder in half down 
the middle, so as to separate each base pair.  Now, imagine walking 
up one of the ropes, “reading off the bases as you go.”38  The 
sequence of bases might read ATGCTCCG.  Another section might 
read an entirely different sequence of bases.  Each section of bases is 
a particular gene, the lengths and sequences of which vary.39 
Many people mistakenly believe that genes are the determinate 
 
 27 WAYNE BECKER ET AL., THE WORLD OF THE CELL 56 (3d ed. 1996). 
 28 Chromosomes are thread-like strands containing nucleic acids that are located 
in a cell’s nucleus.  Id. at 83. 
 29 The nucleus is the cell’s control center, located near the middle of the cell.  Id. 
at 89-99. 
 30 REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 13. 
 31 BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 60. 
 32 Id. at 60-61. 
 33 Id. at 61. 
 34 Id. at 60-61. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Thus, if one strand of the DNA contains the bases TAATCG, its complement 
will read ATTAGC.  Id. at 60-61. 
 37 GRACE, supra note 15, at 17. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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factor of our physical characteristics.40  In actuality, genes do not 
directly determine our physical features.41  Rather, they are the 
instructions for making proteins, the biological compounds directly 
responsible for making us what we are.42  Proteins are “the very 
foundation of living systems,”43 and are involved with nearly every 
product and process necessary for cell survival.44 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
Although the word “biotechnology” conjures up thoughts of 
modern, cutting edge technology, its history dates back thousands of 
years.45  The roots of traditional biotechnology trace back 12,000 
years, when humans independently domesticated plants and animals 
in the Middle East, the Far East, and the Americas.46  Such 
domestication involved farmers selecting various plants and animals, 
and breeding them to produce the largest and healthiest specimens.47 
One of the most prolific and important figures in the era of 
traditional biotechnology was Gregor Mendel,48 the founder of the 
study of genetics, which has enabled the success of modern 
biotechnology.49  While observing the common pea plant in his 
monastery’s garden, Mendel made numerous important discoveries 
known as Mendel’s laws of inheritance. 50  Importantly, Mendel 
discovered that discrete “factors” (known today as genes) determine 
the traits of most organisms.51 
The Twentieth Century scientific community witnessed 
numerous landmark discoveries that paved the way for the era of 
modern biotechnology.52  Modern biotechnology is primarily 
 
 40 Id. at 18 (commenting that “[t]o the average person, a gene is something that 
gives you, say, blue eyes or brown eyes”). 
 41 Id. at 20-25 (noting how genes code for proteins, which in turn are the 
foundation of living systems). 
 42 Id. at 21. 
 43 GRACE, supra note 15, at 21. 
 44 Proteins’ functions are vast and varied.  Id. at 21.  Some of their functions 
include carrying oxygen in the blood, carrying messages between cells, making up 
muscle, activating the immune system, and activating essential chemical reactions by 
acting as enzymes.  Id. 
 45 REISS & STRAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 3. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 509. 
 49 See GRACE, supra note 15, at 6, 8. 
 50 BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 509. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See GRACE, supra note 15, at 28-29 (discussing monumental discoveries such as 
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concerned with developing “commercially valuable therapeutic, 
biomedical, and pharmaceutical products and processes . . . that 
revolve around the manipulation of DNA molecules and their 
encoded proteins.”53  What separates “modern biotechnology” from 
“traditional biotechnology” is not the use of organisms to accomplish 
goals, but rather the processes employed in doing so.54  Modern 
processes such as genetic engineering, specifically recombinant DNA 
technology, allow biotechnologists to “reach further into the genetic 
structure of organisms and to manipulate the building blocks of life 
directly.”55 
Recombinant DNA technology involves isolating and replicating 
the desired gene of one species and inserting it into the genome of 
another species.56  Once transfected, the host cells become capable of 
producing (“expressing”) the protein for which the foreign gene 
codes.57  For example, recombinant DNA technology makes it 
possible for bacteria to mass produce lifesaving substances such as 
human insulin, growth hormones and blood clotting factors, 
previously available only in limited quantities.58  Importantly, 
recombinant DNA technology made the Human Genome Project a 
reality.59 
Launched in 1990 by the Department of Energy and the 
National Institute of Health, the Human Genome Project (“HGP”) is 
a $250 million publicly funded international endeavor focused on 
sequencing the entire human genome.60  In 2001, the HGP 
accomplished its first goal of mapping and sequencing all 100,000 
genes of the human genome.61  The information, in the form of three 
billion base pairs, is “enough to fill more than 200 telephone 
 
the recognition that DNA carries genetic information, DNA’s helical structure, and 
the use of restriction enzymes to cut and splice genetic material). 
 53 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 646. 
 54 GRACE, supra note 15, at 2. 
 55 See ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6. 
 56 BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 520-27. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth & Linda J. Demaine, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel 
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 308 
(2002) (presenting the manner in which gene patents harm research and 
innovation, and suggesting a substantial transformation test that only allows 
patenting of truly novel gene-based inventions). 
 59 See GRACE, supra note 15, at 69-70. 
 60 Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Patents?  The Human Genome 
Project Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 1999 Utility Guidelines, 73 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 747, 754 (2002). 
 61 See id. at 754-55. 
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books.”62 
The next wave of research in understanding human 
development and illness is proteomics.63  Whereas the HGP focused 
on sequencing the entire human genome, proteomics seeks to 
understand all proteins, their biological functions and the 
mechanisms by which they interact.64  Involved in the pursuit of this 
goal is the field of structural genomics, a subset of proteomics, which 
seeks to uncover the biological functions of proteins through study of 
their three-dimensional structure.65 
Although modern biotechnology’s applications are widespread, 
“its greatest impact so far has been in healthcare.”66  Equipped with 
the knowledge resulting from the Human Genome Project, 
biotechnology companies are currently developing innovative drugs 
and diagnostic tools.67  Since many medical ailments are created by 
defective genes, knowledge of the location, structure and function of 
these genes will allow researchers to develop drugs and diagnostic kits 
that treat and diagnose disease at the genetic level, thus leading to 
safer and more effective treatments.68 
Today, biotechnology companies, along with government and 
corporate laboratories, are mapping and sequencing the genomes of 
many species, from humans to bacteria, “with the goal of finding new 
ways of harnessing and exploiting genetic information for economic 
purposes.”69  Given the economic incentives, researchers will continue 
to seek broad patent protection for their genetic and 
biotechnological discoveries.70  It is the role of the Federal Circuit and 
USPTO to maintain an appropriate level of patent protection that 
creates incentives while also preventing overly broad gene patent 
scope.71 
 
 62 Id. at 754. 
 63 ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, Comment, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for Gene 
Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
143, 145 (2000) (arguing that given the detrimental effects of broad gene patents on 
biomedical research, they should be made more difficult to obtain by means of a 
heightened non-obvious standard) (quoting WILLIAM BAINS, BIOTECHNOLOGY FROM A 
TO Z V (1993). 
 67 ANAWALT & POWERS, supra note 6. 
 68 Id. 
 69 RIFKIN, supra note 4, at 190. 
 70 See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 105-06 (1999). 
 71 See Clarisa Long, Side Bar: The Brouhaha Over Expressed Sequence Tags, in CHISUM 
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III. PATENT LAW BACKGROUND 
DNA-based inventions have provided special problems for patent 
law.72  In order to understand these challenges, including the issue of 
broad gene patents, it is necessary to understand the American 
patent law system. 
The constitutional basis for the American patent law system is 
found in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which 
gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
the useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”73  
Given colonial usage and syntax, the clause can be reworked as 
follows: (1) “To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for 
limited times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings; 
and (2) To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for 
limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”74  Although this interpretation highlights the framers’ 
intent of encouraging the useful arts, “it does not however, define the 
exact nature of the patent grant, such as its appropriate balance or 
scope, and subject matter.”75  The founding fathers left that duty to 
Congress,76 which enacted the first patent statute in 1790.77  Since 
then, Congress has enacted several statutory revisions leading up to 
the 1952 Patent Act.78 
Under the 1952 Patent Act, an invention may only receive a 
patent if it is “new and useful,”79 “novel”80 and “non-obvious” to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art.81  Furthermore, the patent 
application’s specification82 must adequately disclose the invention to 
 
ET AL., supra note 10, at 725 (noting that one of the most critical issues surrounding 
the intersection of biotechnology and patent law is the appropriate scope of claims to 
genetic material). 
 72 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 273. 
 73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 74 Karl B. Lutz, A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949). 
 75 Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling 
with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1992). 
 76 Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 77 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 18. 
 78 See id. at 18-21 for a complete history of the patent statutes. 
 79 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
 80 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001). 
 81 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001). 
 82 The specification consists of the written description and the claims.  See 
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 92.  The written description provides background, 
drawings, and a detailed description of the invention.  See id. at 93-102.  The claims 
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the public.83 
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention must be “new and 
useful.”84  “For an invention to be useful within the meaning of the 
statute, a substantial and practical purpose must be discovered and 
disclosed.”85  The utility requirement is part of the patent system’s 
quid pro quo.86  In exchange for the right to exclude, the invention is 
required to work for its intended purpose.87  Unlike mechanical and 
electrical inventions, which often show an end result, proving utility 
of biotechnology inventions is more difficult88 because biotechnology 
inventions “possess an evolving utility,”89 and “are more like building 
blocks rather than a completed building.”90  That is, many 
biotechnology inventions involve methods for producing 
intermediary products or products with unknown results.91 
Under § 102, only novel inventions may be patented,92 ensuring 
that the invention contributes something new to society.93  To be 
considered novel, the invention must not have been “known or used” 
in the United States or “patented or described in a printed 
publication” either in the United States or abroad.94  In patent 
terminology, an invention that is not new is anticipated by prior art.95  
That is, the prior art reference discloses every element of the 
invention’s claims and enables one skilled in the art to make and use 
the invention.96  In addition to the novelty requirement, § 102 
 
define the metes and bounds of the invention and as the “[f]ederal circuit has stated 
time and again, ‘[c]laims are infringed, not specifications.’”  Id. at 103 (quoting SRI 
Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  A 
patent application generally has numerous claims, which often vary in scope.  See id. 
at 104.  Since the claims define the outer bounds of an invention, when we refer to 
broad inventions, we are in fact referring to a patent with broad claims.  Id.  A broad 
claim is one that lacks limitations, which results in a wider scope.  Id. 
 83 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001). 
 84 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 85 Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1061 (citing Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985)). 
 86 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 707. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 93 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 323. 
 94 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 95 Prior art is a term used in patent law that refers to all known technical 
information.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 93.  A patent’s novelty and obviousness 
are judged in light of all known prior art.  See id. 
 96 See id. at 400. 
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contains a statutory bar forbidding patenting when, more than a year 
before filing a patent application, “the invention was patented or 
described in a printed publication” either in the United States or 
abroad, or the invention was “in public use or on sale” in the United 
States.97 
The non-obvious requirement of § 103 is referred to as “the most 
significant obstacle that a patent applicant faces”98 and the “final 
gatekeeper of the patent system.”99  The non-obvious requirement 
serves to prevent the patenting of inventions that while novel, are not 
that different from the prior art.100  An invention is non-patentable if, 
based on all existing knowledge at the time of invention, those skilled 
in the art would have considered the invention obvious.101  That is, a 
single prior art reference does not disclose each and every limitation 
in the claim (thus not novel), but a variety of references, when 
combined, do contain all of the limitations and show the invention 
was already in the public domain.102  Further, in order for the 
references to be combinable, they must suggest to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art that he make the invention and that if made, 
the invention will have a reasonable likelihood of success.103 
Finally, a patent specification must meet the disclosure 
requirements of § 112.104  These requirements provide that the 
specification must (1) contain a “written description” that (2) 
provides sufficient information to “enable” any person skilled in the 
art to make or use the invention, and (3) sets forth the “best mode” 
contemplated by the inventor of making the invention.105  The 
specification must also contain claims “particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as 
his invention.”106 
The first of the three requirements set forth in paragraph one of 
§ 112 is that the specification contain a written description.107  The 
written description provides the technical and background 
 
 97 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 98 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 514. 
 99 Id. (quoting ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 479 (2d ed. 
1997)). 
 100 See id. at 515. 
 101 See Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1061. 
 102 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 514. 
 103 Id. at 584. 
 104 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
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explanation necessary for one to read and understand the patent 
application, including its claims.108  To satisfy the written description 
requirement, the patentee need not describe the claimed subject 
matter exactly.109  The description must, however, “clearly allow 
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] 
invented what is claimed.”110 
Under the enablement requirement of § 112, the inventor must 
set forth in the patent specification enough information to enable 
one skilled in the art to make and use the invention without “undue 
experimentation.”111  Thus, in order for a patentee to receive the 
right to exclude, he must show others how to make and use the 
invention, presumably so competitors may improve upon the claimed 
invention.112  Courts also use the enablement requirement as a claim 
narrowing device.113  Broad claims must be supported by an equally 
broad enablement, and if they are not, the inventor has not taught 
how to “make or use” the invention, and the non-enabled claims will 
not be allowed.114 
Lastly, the first paragraph of § 112 requires that the specification 
“set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.”115  The best mode requirement ensures that the 
inventor discloses the best way of carrying out his invention.116  Its 
purpose is to prevent inventors from obtaining patent protection 
while keeping secret the best way to make their invention.117 
 
 108 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 212. 
 109 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing In re 
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 110 Id. at 1563 (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1012). 
 111 35 U.S.C. § 112.  The term “undue experimentation” does not appear in the 
statute, but it is well established that under the enablement requirement, the 
specification must teach those skilled in the art to make and use the invention 
without “undue experimentation.”  Nat’l Recovery Technologies v. Magnetic 
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating “the scope of 
enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of 
what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue 
experimentation”); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(discussing the factors involved for considering whether a disclosure requires undue 
experimentation). 
 112 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 162. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. 
 115 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 116 Id. 
 117 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 193. 
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A. Statutory Subject Matter 
In addition to the patentability requirements, an invention must 
fall within one of four statutorily defined classes of subject matter as 
set forth in § 101: “processe[s], machine[s], manufacture[s] or 
composition[s] of matter.”118  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,119 the 
Supreme Court broadly interpreted these classes to “include anything 
under the sun that is made by man.”120  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty is most noteworthy, 
however, for its ruling that genetically engineered multi-cellular 
organisms constitute patentable subject matter.121  The Court 
explained that genetically engineered bacteria was patentable 
because the claim was not to a “hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity having a 
distinct name, character, [and] use.”122 
Under the reasoning in Chakrabarty, “products of nature” are 
patentable so long as the inventor has changed the product in some 
non-naturally occurring way to conform to the statutory requirements 
of the Patent Act.123  Modern courts will allow patents for genes and 
DNA sequences “as long as the genetic materials are claimed in a 
non-naturally occurring form, that is, as an isolated or purified 
molecule.”124  Those seeking gene patents argue that their genes are 
isolated and purified because they “have been manipulated to 
eliminate the non-coding region[s]” found in the body’s DNA, while 
still maintaining the same function.125 
B. Infringement 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), “whoever, without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United 
States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”126  Because 
 
 118 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 119 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 120 Id. at 309 (quoting  S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2399). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 310. 
 123 Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1067. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with 
Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 71 (2002) (presenting the various 
arguments for why gene patents should not be issued as a matter of law and policy). 
 126 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
  
2004 COMMENT 723 
inventions are defined by their claims,127 courts compare the claims of 
the accused device to the claims of the patented invention when 
determining infringement issues.128  The infringement analysis 
comprises two distinct inquiries.129  First, courts determine whether 
the accused invention literally infringes.130  That is, whether every 
“limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device.”131  If 
the court does not find literal infringement, it next examines 
whether there is infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.132 
The doctrine of equivalents allows a court to find infringement 
when the infringing device, although not literally infringing, 
“performs substantially the same function” as the patented invention 
“in substantially the same way, to obtain the same result.”133  The 
doctrine finds justification in the fact that “the language in the patent 
claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe 
with complete precision the range of its novelty.”134  Given the 
imprecise nature of language, an interpretation of patent claims 
based on their literal terms would greatly diminish a patent’s value.135  
For this reason the scope of a patent “is not limited to its literal terms 
but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”136  
Recently, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,137 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that “equivalents remain a firmly 
entrenched part of the settled rights protected by the patent.”138 
In extending the protection available to the inventor, the 
doctrine of equivalents also renders the true scope of a patent less 
clear.139  This, in turn, diminishes the notice function of claims by 
 
 127 See supra note 82. 
 128 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 830-83. 
 129 Robert P. Merges & Richard. R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 853 (1990). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 132 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 853. 
 133 Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Union 
Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)). 
 134 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kobyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002). 
 135 See id. (explaining that a literal interpretation would destroy a patent’s value by 
allowing would-be infringers to escape liability by making minor, insubstantial 
variations that do not literally infringe the patent). 
 136 Id. at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854)). 
 137 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 138 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. 
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)). 
 139 See id. at 727 (noting “that by extending protection beyond the literal terms in 
a patent, the doctrine of equivalents can create substantial uncertainty about where 
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making it hard for competitors to examine a patent’s claims and 
predict what does and does not infringe.140  To reduce the uncertainty 
created by the doctrine, rules exist that forbid resort to the doctrine, 
as a matter of law, under certain circumstances.141  “One of the most 
important of these [rules] is prosecution history142 estoppel,” which 
estops the patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents to 
recapture subject matter surrendered during the patent’s 
prosecution.143 
Recently, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co.,144 the 
Supreme Court announced two key findings regarding the scope of 
prosecution history estoppel.145  First, the Court ruled that 
prosecution history estoppel arises for any amendment related to 
patentability, not just those to avoid the prior art.146  Second, the 
Court ruled that when a patentee narrows his claim by amendment, 
he is presumed to have surrendered the subject matter lost through 
amendment.147  As a result, the patentee may not invoke the doctrine 
of equivalents to capture amended subject matter unless he can show 
“that at the time of amendment one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”148 
 
the patent monopoly ends”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Michael P. Sandonato & Carl. B. Wischhusen, What ‘Festo’ Portends, THE NAT’L 
L. J., June 10, 2002, at A19. 
 142 The “prosecution history” is the record of proceedings between the patent 
attorney and the examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
regarding the prosecution of the patent.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 109-16.  
Patent prosecution is the process of obtaining a patent.  Id.  In many ways, patent 
prosecution is a give and take between the patent attorney and the examiner, with 
the examiner objecting (through a process called an office action) to certain parts of 
the application (such as the claims as originally written) and the attorney acting to 
rectify the objections through amendment.  Id.  For instance, as is often the case, an 
examiner might reject a patent’s original claims as being too broad.  Id.  In response 
to the office action, the patent attorney will amend and narrow the claims and 
resubmit the application for approval.  Id. 
 143 Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 141, at A19. 
 144 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 145 See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41. 
 146 Id. at 735-37. 
 147 Id. at 738-40.  In adopting this approach, the Supreme Court overruled the 
Federal Circuit’s “complete bar,” which permanently disallowed claims of 
equivalence for any material surrendered during the patent’s prosecution.  See Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 148 The Supreme Court offered three examples of how the patentee may 
overcome the presumption: by showing that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the 
time of amendment, by showing that the rationale for the amendment bears no 
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent, or when there is some other 
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IV. THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF GENE PATENTS ON 
INNOVATION, RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE 
Although gene patents have become a firmly entrenched part of 
the patent system,149 “the wisdom of such action is now being 
questioned.”150  While biotechnologists argue that gene patents are 
necessary to promote cost recovery and investment in new research,151 
numerous researchers, clinicians, legal commentators and politicians 
feel otherwise.152  Particularly, they point to the deleterious effects of 
gene patents on biomedical research, biotechnological innovation, 
patient care and the free exchange of information among 
researchers.153 
Although the examples illustrating the deleterious effects of 
gene patents are numerous, they revolve around the same core 
principle: the right of exclusion is particularly harmful with gene 
patents because a gene patent gives its holder exclusive rights to the 
gene, its sequence, and all of the gene’s derivatives.154  Thus, the 
 
reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have 
described the insubstantial variation in question.  Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740-41. 
 149 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth & Linda J. Demaine, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel 
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 304 
(2002) (noting that the USPTO now routinely grants, and the federal courts 
routinely uphold, patents on naturally occurring genes, DNA fragments, and other 
biochemicals). 
 150 Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 
NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 803 (2002) (discussing the mounting body of evidence 
suggesting that gene patents are harming biomedical research and patient care); see 
also Andrews, supra note 125 (presenting the various arguments for why gene patents 
should not be issued as a matter of law and policy); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Michael 
A. Heller, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing how a proliferation of upstream patentees may deter 
innovation by blocking downstream patentees from developing innovative 
technologies); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating 
the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783 (2000) (discussing how patent law 
struggles to develop new tools for analyzing recent advances in DNA sequences); 
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149 (presenting the manner in which gene patents 
harm research and innovation and suggesting a substantial transformation test that 
only allows patenting of truly novel gene-based inventions); Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra 
note 66 (arguing that given the detrimental effects of broad gene patents on 
biomedical research they should be made more difficult to obtain by means of a 
heightened non-obvious standard). But see John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 
SCIENCE 689 (1998) (positing that despite arguments to the contrary, genetically 
based patents are necessary to provide incentive to invest in and disclose DNA 
research). 
 151 See GRACE, supra note 15, at 204. 
 152 See Andrews, supra note 125, at 66 (presenting various arguments for why gene 
patents should not be issued as a matter of law and policy). 
 153 See supra note 150. 
 154 See Andrews, supra note 125, at 70-72; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 
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patent holder may prevent potential competitors from conducting 
any research or from developing any therapeutic applications based 
on the gene’s DNA sequence.155  Even when the patent holder is 
willing to license, the costs can be “exorbitant.”156 
This situation is unique to gene patents because unlike drugs 
and other devices, scientists often cannot design around gene 
patents.157  Whereas a pharmaceutical company can design around a 
drug patent by creating an alternative drug that treats the same 
condition, the competitor of a gene patent holder has no such 
option.158  In order to treat or diagnose a disease at the genetic level, 
a competitor needs access to the disease-causing gene.159  However, 
the patent holder, arguably to the detriment of health care and 
biotechnological innovation, controls access to the gene.160  
Recognizing the consequences of gene patent ownership, the 
National Academy of Sciences has noted that broad gene patents 
“might seriously impede the research and development necessary to 
realize the promise of the human genome sequence in generating 
significant new treatments and cures for human disease.”161 
A. Gene Patent Proliferation as a Deterrent to Innovation 
The right of exclusion is particularly harmful in biotechnology 
because biotechnological research and development involves the use 
of fundamental, but often patented biochemicals, 162 such as genes, 
ESTs,163 SNPs,164 and proteins.  Today, given the proliferation of gene 
 
149, at 413-21. 
 155 Andrews, supra note 125, at 70. 
 156 Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 415-19 (commenting that because 
fundamental biochemical products are needed for modern research and 
development, patents on such products “may cause costs to accumulate to the point 
where scientifically valuable research becomes infeasible for researchers or 
inaccessible to large portions of the public”). 
 157 Andrews, supra note 125, at 78-79. 
 158 Andrews, supra note 150, at 805 (commenting that unlike technologies such as 
the picture tube, which can be designed around, there are no alternatives to the 
patented human genes needed for genetic diagnosis and gene therapy). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See supra note 150. 
 161 Letter from Bruce Alberts, President National Academy of Sciences, to 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Mar. 22, 2000) (Comment 41 on the 
Revised Utility Examination Guidelines), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/sol/comments/utiliguide/nas/pdf. 
 162 See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 420. 
 163 The USPTO surprised many in 1997 by announcing that it would grant patents 
to small sections of genes lacking a known function, known as expressed sequence 
tags (“ESTs”), where novelty, non-obviousness and utility are proven.  Andrews, supra 
note 125, at 83-84.  EST’s are short cDNA sequences that lack a known function that 
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related patents, a biotechnology company must first identify and 
overcome, through licensing negotiations, every blocking patent its 
research will infringe.165  As a result, any one patent holder could 
derail the entire process by refusing to negotiate.166  Even when the 
patent holder will negotiate, the costs of licensing are often 
prohibitively high.167 
In effect, each blocking patent acts as “[a]nother tollbooth on 
the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the 
pace of downstream biomedical innovation.”168  Although the cost of 
overcoming one “tollbooth” may not present a problem, “the impact 
of multiple tollbooths on downstream research . . . and costs can be 
profound.”169  Illustrating the reality of this situation, the Chief 
Executive Officer of Human Genome Sciences noted that “[a]ny 
company that wants to be in the business of using genes, proteins, or 
antibodies as drugs has a very high probability of running afoul of 
our patents.170  From a commercial point of view, they are severely 
constrained-and far more than they realize.”171 
 
scientists collect from expressed DNA.  See Lawrence Kass & Michael Nitabach, A 
Roadmap for Biotechnology Patents? Federal Circuit Precedent and the PTO’s New 
Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 233, 245 (2002).  If an EST is ever found to be 
part of a valuable gene or code for a valuable protein, the patent holder may 
prohibit others from conducting research, producing proteins, or developing drugs 
that involve use of the EST’s sequence.  Greenfield, supra note 75, at 1090-91. 
 164 Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) are areas in the human genome 
differing from another by only one base pair.  Rai, supra note 70, at 105-06.  They are 
of particular interest to scientists because of their potential utility in identifying 
genes responsible for disorders such as “diabetes, hypertension, asthma, common 
cancers, and major neuropsychiatric diseases.”  Id.  Currently, much of SNP research 
is in its initial stages and the majority of newly discovered SNPs have not been linked 
to identifiable diseases.  Id.  Consequently, many of the patent applications filed on 
SNP research have been based on SNP’s of unknown function, for which the 
commercial applications are not yet clear.  Id. 
 165 Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 414-21. 
 166 Andrews, supra note 125, at 85. 
 167 Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 415-19 (commenting that because 
fundamental biochemical products are needed for modern research and 
development, patents on such products “may cause costs to accumulate to the point 
where scientifically valuable research becomes infeasible for researchers or 
inaccessible to large portions of the public”). 
 168 Id. at 414 (quoting Rebecca Eisenberg & Michael A. Heller, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998)). 
 169 Id. at 418. 
 170 Lawrence M. Fisher, The Race to Cash In on the Genetic Code, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
1999, § 3, at 1. 
 171 Id. 
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B. The Potential to Harm Health Care 
Gene patents threaten to undermine the overall quality of health 
care by preventing biomedical research172 and by decreasing the 
quality and availability of diagnostic testing.173  Gene patents 
endanger biomedical research in numerous ways.  First, the 
opportunity to patent discoveries has led to a decrease in the free 
exchange of information once common among scientists.174  Now, 
researchers may delay publishing valuable information until their 
patent rights are secured, which may take several years.175  As noted by 
Lori Andrews, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
“scientists directly involved with commercializing their research [are] 
three times more likely to delay publication and twice as likely to 
refuse sharing research than scientists conducting basic work.”176  In 
another example offered by Andrews, progress in autism research has 
been delayed because researchers have refused to share tissue 
samples in an effort to be the first to find and patent the autism-
causing gene.177 
 Another way in which gene patents harm biomedical research 
is by preventing it altogether.178  For instance, although numerous 
mutations in the same gene are often responsible for certain diseases, 
companies such as Athena Neuroscience Inc., which holds a patent 
for the gene associated with Alzheimer’s Disease, forbid laboratories 
other than their own from screening for mutations in the gene.179  As 
a result, the chances of finding additional mutations are severely 
diminished—a quite unfortunate result considering that knowledge 
of such mutations could prove useful in diagnosing those who would 
not otherwise be diagnosed.180 
A further example of this phenomenon offered by Professor 
Andrews is the European patent for BRCA1, a gene implicated in 
breast cancer.181  In 2001, the United States biotech company Myriad 
 
 172 See generally Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 66. 
 173 Andrews, supra note 125; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 413-
22. 
 174 GRACE, supra note 15, at 205. 
 175 Andrews, supra note 125, at 79-81. 
 176 Id. at 80. 
 177 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. 
 178 See Andrews, supra note 125, at 79; see also Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, 
at 415-21. 
 179 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. 
 180 See Andrews, supra note 125, at 89. 
 181 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. 
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Genetics received the European patent on BRCA1.182  The broad 
patent covers “all methods for diagnosing breast cancer by comparing 
a patient’s BRCA1 gene with the BRCA1 gene Myriad describes in its 
patent.”183  After acquiring the patent, Myriad refused to allow French 
doctors to test for the BRCA1 gene.184  Instead, Myriad insisted on 
conducting all testing in its laboratory.185  French physicians allege 
that Myriad’s test screens for only ten to twenty percent of potential 
BRCA1 mutations.186  However, additional tests aimed at identifying 
the remaining mutations cannot be developed without infringing 
Myriad’s broad patent.187  This same patent prevented a Yale 
researcher from continuing his breast cancer research due to fear of 
infringing the license limitations on the patented gene.188 
Gene patents also impede the progress of pharmacogenomics.189  
Although many drugs only work on a percentage of users with a 
particular genetic disposition, pharmaceutical companies may use 
their gene patents to prevent customers from determining if the drug 
is efficacious for them.190  For example, even though genetic tests 
could reveal for whom certain drugs will work, pharmaceutical 
companies have prevented the development of such tests by 
patenting the tests and refusing to develop or let anyone else develop 
them.191  As a result, customers can only speculate whether their costly 
drugs are compatible with their genetic make-ups.192 
The downstream costs of gene patents also threaten to decrease 
access to gene-based diagnostics and therapeutics.193  On the road to 
product development, biotechnology companies must overcome the 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. (citing Declan Butler & Sally Goodman, French researchers take a stand against 
breast cancer gene patent, 413 NATURE  95 (2001)). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See id. (citing Gad et al., Identification of a large rearrangement of the BRCA1 gene 
using color bar code on combed DNA in an American breast/ovarian cancer family previously 
studied by direct sequencing, 38 J. MED. GENET. 388 (2001)). 
 187 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. 
 188 Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 417. 
 189 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804.  Pharmacogenomics is “the application of 
genomics to pharmaceutical research, using genome studies to identify genes that 
account for differences in different individuals.”  Am. Med. Assoc., 
Pharmacogenomics, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2306.html 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2003). 
 190 Andrews, supra note 150, at 804. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 150, at 416-17. 
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prohibitively high costs of numerous blocking patents.194  Such costs 
are likely passed on to consumers.195  As a result, consumers face 
decreased accessibility to valuable products, such as genetic testing.196  
As noted by Professor Andrews, this concern has recently become 
reality in Canada.197  The province of British Columbia has stopped 
paying for genetic breast cancer testing because the health care 
system could not afford to pay what Myriad, the owner of the patent, 
was charging.198 
C. The Positive Attributes of Gene Patents 
Recognizing the arguments against gene patents, John Doll, the 
USPTO’s Director of Biotechnology Examination, argues that 
isolated and purified DNA sequences must be patentable.199  He 
believes that “[w]ithout the incentive of patents, there would be less 
investment in research, and scientists might not disclose their new 
technologies to the public.”200  He notes that such investment is 
necessary for the survival of small biotech companies.201  In addition, 
Doll compares the current controversy of gene patents to the 
controversy surrounding polymer chemistry patents thirty years ago.202  
He reminds us that although commentators, fearing the destruction 
of an industry, argued against broad claims to the building blocks of 
basic polymers, no such destruction occurred.203 
Further, commentators posit that without gene patents, 
biotechnology companies would turn to trade secret protection.204  As 
a result, companies would refuse to disclose any information, which 
would prove extremely harmful to biotechnology, an industry 
dependent on the free exchange of information.205  This in turn 
would lead to duplicate work, as companies would be unwilling to 
 
 194 See supra pp. 726-727. 
 195 See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 416. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See Andrews, supra note 125, at 91. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Doll, supra note 150, at 689. 
 200 Id. at 690. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 689. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents After Festo: Rethinking the Heightened 
Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 919, 947 (2002) 
(arguing for relaxed standards of enablement and written description in light of the 
Federal Circuit’s complete bar rule). 
 205 Id. 
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license their technologies for fear of reverse engineering.206  In the 
end, the absence of disclosure could harm innovation by depriving 
researchers of the building blocks necessary to further the current 
state of the art.207 
D. Appropriate Solutions to the Gene Patenting Dilemma 
The compelling arguments both for and against the issuance of 
gene patents highlight the challenges facing courts, legislators and 
policy makers alike.208  Although the ill effects of gene patents on 
research and health care are real,209 without such patents venture 
capitalists may be less willing to invest in new technologies.210  Such 
lack of investment could make it difficult for small biotech companies 
to succeed.211  At the same time, the proliferation of gene-based 
patents has created multiple “tollbooth[s] on the road to product 
development.”212  Even if small companies receive investment, the 
prohibitively high cost of navigating through today’s intellectual 
property minefield may very well prove disabling.213  Further, gene 
patents arguably have reduced the exchange of information among 
researchers by delaying publication times.214  If such patents were not 
in existence, however, companies might resort to trade secret 
protection, thus precluding all disclosure.215 
In light of the complexities gene patents create, remedies are 
needed that maintain a level of economic incentive without causing 
significant harm to health care and biotechnological innovation.216  
Suggested alternatives include government encouragement of patent 
pools,217 compulsory licensing schemes for researchers,218 and a “fair 
 
 206 Id.  Reverse engineering involves “starting with the known product and 
working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or 
manufacture.”  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
 207 Arriola, supra note 204, at 947. 
 208 According to Professor Andrews, commentators have proposed various 
solutions to the gene patent dilemma, such as banning them altogether, patent 
pools, and mandatory licensing.  Andrews, supra note 125, at 67, 101-06. 
 209 See generally supra note 150. 
 210 See Doll, supra note 150, at 689; see also GRACE, supra note 15, at 204. 
 211 Doll, supra note 150, at 690. 
 212 Eisenberg & Heller, supra note 150, at 699. 
 213 Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 413-23. 
 214 Andrews, supra note 125, at 79-81; see also GRACE, supra note 15, at 205 (noting 
that broad gene patents “create[] possessiveness about basic information”) . 
 215 See Arriola, supra note 204, at 947. 
 216 See generally Andrews, supra note 125. 
 217 Id. at 101-03. 
 218 Id. at 103. 
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use” exception for research involving genetic sequence information. 
219  Others, recognizing the problem of broad patents in 
biotechnology,220 have suggested patent law specific means of 
regulating gene patents, such as a higher non-obvious standard,221 
and a substantial transformation test that would only allow patenting 
of gene-based inventions “transformed in such a way as to create a 
new product that is substantially different in function from the 
naturally occurring phenomenon.”222  Recently, Judge Gajarsa of the 
Federal Circuit noted the possible need for higher standards of 
patentability in biotechnology cases.223  Consistent with those who 
advocate the creation of higher standards for biotechnology patents, 
this Comment proposes a foreseeability-based restriction on the 
doctrine of equivalents in biotechnology patent cases.224 
V.  LIMITING GENE PATENT CLAIM SCOPE THROUGH A 
BIOTECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC, FORESEEABILITY-BASED LIMITATION ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
Recognizing the detrimental effects that broad gene patents may 
have on biotechnological progress, Professors Robert Merges and 
Richard Nelson offer a solution.225  They argue that “scope limitations 
based on close adherence to the inventor’s disclosure and judicious 
 
 219 See The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 
107th Cong. (2002).  In March of 2002, Rep. Lynn Rivers introduced the “Genomic 
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,” aimed at addressing the 
“troublesome” effects of gene patenting on biomedical research and patient care.  29 
CONG. REC. E353 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Rivers).  Among the 
bill’s provisions is a subsection exempting from infringement liability the “use [of] 
patented genetic sequence information for non-commercial research purposes.”  Id. 
at E354.  Rep. Rivers likened this exemption to the “fair use” defense in copyright 
law.  Id. 
 220 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1204 (2002) (discussing the emergence of technology-
specific patent law doctrines). 
 221 See generally Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 66. 
 222 See Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 392. 
 223 Arthur J. Gajarsa, Hon. Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture: The Fifth Annual 
Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law, 6 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002). 
 224 See infra Part V for an examination of how a foreseeability-based limit on the 
doctrine of equivalents can spur biotechnological innovation. 
 225 In their work on the economics of patent scope, Robert P. Merges and Richard 
R. Nelson argue that the proper scope of patents is a dynamic, industry-based issue.  
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 880.  With regard to science-based industries, 
such as biotechnology, Merges and Nelson warn of the dangers that result from 
“awarding overly broad patents early in the history of an industry founded on recent 
scientific advances.”  Id. at 915. 
  
2004 COMMENT 733 
use of the doctrine of equivalents provide the surest way around [the] 
danger” of broad gene patents.226  The Federal Circuit has already 
acted to limit gene patents through “close adherence to the 
inventor’s disclosure,”227 by elevating the standards of written 
description and enablement for biotechnology cases in Amgen v. 
Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co.,228 Fiers v. Revel,229 and Regents of the Univ. of 
Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co.230  This Comment proposes that the Federal 
Circuit heed Merges and Nelson’s second piece of advice, 
“[j]udicious use of the doctrine of equivalents,”231 and adopt a 
biotechnology-specific version of the foreseeability standard 
articulated in Judge Rader’s concurring opinion in Johnson & Johnston 
Assocs., Inc.232 
In Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., the patentee claimed an 
assembly of a printed circuit board “that prevent[ed] most damage 
during manual handling.”233  The invention involved adhering fragile 
copper foil used in the circuit board to a stiffer substrate sheet of 
aluminum.234  This construction allowed workers to handle the 
aluminum, rather than the copper foil, during the production 
process, thus preventing the damage to the copper circuits associated 
with handling the copper foil directly.235  The specification identified 
aluminum as the preferred material for the substrate, but also 
 
 226 See id. 
 227 Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 915.  See Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written 
Description and Enablement Requirement to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 267 (2000) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has raised the bar with regard 
to written description and enablement in an effort to limit the scope of gene based 
patents); see also Emanuel Vacchiano, Comment, It’s a Wonderful Genome: The Written 
Description Requirement Protects the Human Genome from Overly-Broad Patents, 32 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 805 (1999) (discussing how the Federal Circuit has applied the 
written description requirement to narrow gene patent scope); Margaret Sampson, 
Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 
U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000) 
(discussing the current trend of the Federal Circuit to heighten both the enablement 
and written description requirements for biotechnological inventions under 35 
U.S.C. § 112). 
 228 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 229 See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 230 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 231 Merges and Nelson’s second piece of advice for limiting gene patent scope is 
“[j]udicious use of the doctrine of equivalents.” Merges & Nelson, supra note 129, at 
915. 
 232 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 233 Id. at 1049. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
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identified that “other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloy, 
may be used.”236  Despite disclosing steel and nickel alloy, the 
patentee only claimed aluminum as a substrate.237  The accused 
device used steel.238 
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit held that the accused patent 
did not infringe.239  Notably, the court’s opinion settled an issue over 
which Federal Circuit judges have long disagreed: whether subject 
matter that is disclosed, but not claimed, is within the purview of the 
doctrine of equivalents.240  The court ruled that such subject matter 
may not be captured through the doctrine of equivalents and is 
dedicated to the public.241  While concurring with the majority 
opinion, Judge Rader, joined by Chief Judge Mayer, argued that the 
court should have instead adopted a broader foreseeability bar to the 
doctrine of equivalents.242 
Judge Rader articulated his foreseeability standard in a desire to 
achieve a “better balance between the notice function of claims and 
the protective function of non-textual infringement.”243  Under the 
foreseeability approach, the patentee “has an obligation to draft 
claims that capture all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the 
invention.”244  If the claims do not “capture subject matter that the 
patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen,”245 the patentee may 
not rely on the doctrine of equivalents in extending the scope of his 
claims beyond their literal meaning.246  Thus, with the exception of 
objectively unforeseeable subject matter, such as after arising 
technology,247 or subject matter “cloaked by the subtlety of 
language,”248 the patent applicant may not broaden his claims to 
 
 236 Id. at 1050. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1050. 
 239 Id. at 1055. 
 240 Joseph M O’Malley Jr. & Bruce M. Wexler, Battle Lines Form on Matter Disclosed 
But Not Claimed, 227 N.Y. L.J. S4 (2002). 
 241 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1054-55. 
 242 Id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 243 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1059 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 244 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 245 Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 246 Id. at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 247 Id. at 1058 (Rader, J., concurring) (citing Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., 
Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents 
applies to after-arising technology)).  “After arising” technology refers to technology 
that is developed after the claims are drafted.  Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past as 
Prologue, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 75, 81 n.29 (2001). 
 248 Id. (quoting Sage Prods., Inc., 126 F.3d at 1425). 
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reach objectively foreseeable, yet unclaimed subject matter.249 
Compared to the Supreme Court’s Festo250 pronouncement 
regarding prosecution history esoppel, the foreseeability standard is 
an even greater restraint on a patentee’s ability to broaden his claims 
through the doctrine of equivalents.  It is so highly limiting because it 
applies to the claims as originally drafted, regardless of whether they 
are amended,251 and thus before prosecution history estoppel arises. 252  
Consequently, under a foreseeability approach, the patentee is 
precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to capture any 
foreseeable, yet unclaimed subject matter,253 notwithstanding a lack of 
prosecution history estoppel. 
Although Judge Rader spoke generally about the desirability of 
limiting the doctrine of equivalents via a foreseeability standard, he 
did not speak in terms of biotechnology or gene patents.254  This 
comment, however, argues for a biotechnology–specific application 
of the foreseeability standard.  It examines the legal authority for 
applying a heightened, more restrictive version of the doctrine of 
equivalents in biotechnology patent cases.  It seeks to highlight both 
how and why a biotechnology specific, foreseeability-based limitation 
on the doctrine of equivalents would prevent broad reaching gene 
patents, thereby contributing to biotechnological innovation. 
 
A. The Foreseeability-Based Limitation is Consistent with Recent 
Patent Law Precedent Limiting the Availability of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents 
The foreseeability approach, which restricts a patentee’s access 
to the doctrine of equivalents, is in accord with recent Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court decisions generally limiting the doctrine’s 
 
 249 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 250 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722; see supra text accompanying notes 144-48 for a 
discussion of Festo. 
 251 See supra note 142 for the difference between original and amended claims. 
 252 Jessica L. Bagner & Steven J. Rizzi, Litigating Infringement Under the Doctrine of 
Equivalents After Festo, 721 PLI/PAT 345, 365 (2002) (examining Festo and the 
implications of a foreseeability standard in guiding the application of prosecution 
history estoppel).  Prosecution history estoppel precludes the patentee from 
capturing subject matter lost through amendment.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 142-48.  In contrast, the foreseeability approach applies to the original claims 
before they are amended, and thus before prosecution history estoppel becomes 
applicable.  See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., 
concurring).  See supra note 142 for a discussion of patent prosecution. 
 253 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 254 Id. 
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applicability.255  The holdings in Pennwault Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, 
Inc.256 and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.257 made it 
more difficult to prove non-textual infringement by requiring a 
patentee to show equivalence for every element in the claim, not just 
the claim as a whole.  In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & 
Assocs.,258 the Federal Circuit again limited the doctrine in holding 
that it cannot be used to embrace prior art.259  Further, the court-
created doctrine of prosecution history estoppel,260 a major limitation 
on the doctrine of equivalents, prevents the patentee from claiming 
equivalence for any amendment related to patentability made during 
the patent’s prosecution.261  Finally, in Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 
the Federal Circuit held that subject matter disclosed but not 
claimed, “perhaps the ultimate example of subject matter that is 
foreseeable,”262 may not be reached by the doctrine of equivalents.263 
 Also, the Federal Circuit has, on occasion, used a foreseeability 
approach to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents.264  
For instance, in Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc.,265 the Federal 
Circuit held that the doctrine of equivalents may not be used to 
capture foreseeable modifications to a claimed invention.266  
According to the court, “a skilled patent drafter would foresee the 
limiting potential of the ‘over said slot’ limitation.”267  The court 
stressed that the patentee could have sought claims with fewer 
structural limitations if it wanted broad patent protection but instead 
“left the PTO with manifestly limited claims that it now seeks to 
expand through the doctrine of equivalents.”268  Thus, the court 
declared, “as between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to 
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it 
 
 255 Id. at 1056-57 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 256 Pennwault Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 257 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40. 
 258 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 259 Id. at 683. 
 260 See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an overview of prosecution 
history estoppel. 
 261 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 734-40. 
 262 See Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 143, at A19. 
 263 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1054-55. 
 264 See id. at 1057-58 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 265 The patent at issue in Sage involved a system for safely disposing of sharp 
medical instruments.  See Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1422. 
 266 Id. at 1425 (noting that “[i]t is the patentee who must bear the cost of its 
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure”). 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
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is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection 
for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”269 
B. The Foreseeability Standard is Consistent with Federal Circuit 
Precedent Creating Heightened, Biotechnology-Specific Patent Law 
Principles for Preventing Broad Gene Patents 
A biotechnology-specific application of the foreseeability 
standard would be consistent with recent Federal Circuit precedent 
employing biotechnology-specific means to limit gene patent scope.270  
In particular, the Federal Circuit has adopted elevated standards of 
enablement271 and written description272 for biotechnology patents, in 
an attempt to limit claims to gene-based inventions.273  These 
heightened patentability standards for biotechnology patents are set 
forth in Amgen,274 Fiers275 and Eli Lilly.276 
One of the Federal Circuit’s most notable decisions involving the 
use of the enablement requirement to limit biotechnology patent 
claims is Amgen.277  In Amgen, the plaintiff, Amgen, and defendant 
both held patents on technology relevant to the production of 
erythropoietin (“EPO”), a protein responsible for stimulating the 
production of red blood cells.278  Amgen’s patent was for a 
recombinant DNA version of EPO.279  Amgen claimed all possible 
DNA sequences coding for functional equivalents or “analogs” of the 
human EPO protein.280  EPO analogs were defined as those proteins 
having the biological properties of normal EPO, “but encoded for by 
a DNA sequence different than the normal EPO DNA sequence.”281 
In its decision, the Federal Circuit invalidated claim 7,282 which 
 
 269 Id. 
 270 See supra note 227. 
 271 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14 for an overview of the enablement 
requirement. 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 107-10 for an overview of the written 
description requirement. 
 273 See supra note 227. 
 274 See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1200. 
 275 See Fiers, 984 F.3d at 1164. 
 276 See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1559. 
 277 See Cantor, supra note 227, at 291. 
 278 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1203-04. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 1204. 
 281 Sampson, supra note 227, at 1241 (interpreting claim 7 in Amgen). 
 282 Claim 7 was directed to: 
A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a 
DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid 
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was directed to “[a] purified and isolated DNA sequence,” for lack of 
enablement.283  According to the court, Amgen had not disclosed 
enough information to enable one skilled in the art to predictably 
produce DNA sequences coding for EPO analogs with EPO-like 
activity.284  Whereas one could read Amgen’s patent to claim 
thousands, if not millions, of DNA sequences, Amgen had only 
generated fifty to eighty analogs.285  Regarding the analogs, an Amgen 
scientist testified that he could not say whether they possessed the 
same biological properties as human EPO.286  As a result, the court 
concluded that “mak[ing] the gene and disclos[ing] a handful of 
analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained,” is not 
sufficient to claim “all of the gene sequences that have EPO-like 
activity.”287 
Significantly, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amgen limits an 
inventor’s ability to obtain broad gene patents by claiming every 
biologically active variation of a gene’s DNA sequence.288  While an 
inventor “may be able to write down the possible variations of a 
gene’s DNA sequence, unless the inventor can reliably predict the 
effect of the variations on the activity of the encoded protein, the 
inventor has no right to claim all biologically significant analogs of a 
gene.”289 
In addition to the enablement requirement of § 112, a patent 
specification must also contain a written description describing the 
invention in “sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly 
conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention.”290  
Whereas a generic statement describing the invention is usually 
sufficient with regard to chemical materials, such has not been the 
case with genetic material.291  An adequate written description of a 
DNA sequence “requires more than a mere statement that it is part of 
 
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow 
possession of the biological property of causing bone marrow cells 
to increase production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to 
increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake. 
Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204. 
 283 Id. at 1213. 
 284 Id. at 1213-14. 
 285 Id. at 1213 (noting the district court’s findings). 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 1214. 
 288 See Sampson, supra note 227, at 1242. 
 289 Id. 
 290 See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 
1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 291 See id. at 1568. 
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the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; 
what is required is a description of the DNA itself.”292  Thus, whereas 
constructive reduction to practice is usually sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement, the Federal Circuit has heightened the written 
description requirement for biotechnology by requiring a description 
of the DNA itself.293 
In Fiers, the Federal Circuit heard an appeal from a three-way 
interference action in the USPTO between Sugano, Revel and Fiers 
regarding conflicting claims to a gene coding for beta interferon.294  
Fiers’s patent application disclosed a method for isolating the DNA 
sequence coding for beta-interferon, which experts testified was 
adequate to allow one skilled in the art to isolate beta-interferon 
without undue experimentation.295 The court, however, relying on its 
reasoning in Amgen, ruled that Fiers was not the first to conceive this 
method because he had not defined the gene other than by its 
biological function or activity.296  As for Revel, the court ruled his 
application invalid for lack of a satisfactory written description.297  
While Revel disclosed methods for isolating the DNA coding for beta-
interferon, he did not disclose a complete DNA sequence coding for 
beta-interferon.298  The court reasoned that a satisfactory written 
description for DNA must contain the same degree of specificity 
required to prove conception.299  Thus, according to the court, a 
method for isolating beta-interferon without disclosure of the 
complete nucleotide sequence does not suffice.300  The court awarded 
priority to Sugano, whose application disclosed a method for isolating 
the DNA sequence as well as the DNA’s complete nucleotide 
sequence.301 
In 1997, the Federal Circuit created an even higher written 
description standard for biotechnology inventions in The Regents of 
California v. Eli Lilly.302  In Eli Lilly, the patent at issue related to 
recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that produce human 
 
 292 Id. at 1566-67. 
 293 See Arriola, supra note 204, at 937. 
 294 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1166-68. 
 295 Id. at 1167. 
 296 Id. at 1169. 
 297 Id. at 1170-71. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at 1171. 
 300 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71. 
 301 Id. at 1167. 
 302 See Arriola, supra note 204, at 936 (discussing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
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insulin.303 The patent featured broad claims for cDNA304 coding for 
human, vertebrate and mammalian insulin,305 and disclosed the 
relevant cDNA sequence for rat insulin.306  The patent application 
also disclosed a general method for obtaining human cDNA.307  
According to the court, while the specification supported a claim to 
cDNA coding for rat insulin, it did not support a broader claim for 
human insulin or the genus claim covering the cDNA of vertebrates 
or mammals.308 
Building on Fiers, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an adequate 
written description of a DNA sequence requires more than a 
description of the protein for which it encodes or a method for 
preparing it.309  The court opined that the specification did not 
adequately describe the claim to human insulin because, while the 
specification described a method for preparing human insulin cDNA, 
it failed to provide the actual nucleotide sequence of human cDNA.310  
As for the genus claims, the court found the description of rat insulin 
insufficient to describe the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian 
insulin cDNA.311 
C. A Biotechnology-Specific Foreseeability Limit on the Doctrine of 
Equivalents will Reinforce the Federal Circuit’s Goal of Limiting 
Gene Patent Scope 
A biotechnology-specific application of the objective 
foreseeability standard will complement and further buttress the 
Federal Circuit’s purpose in raising the biotech patentability bar: the 
prevention of overly broad gene-based patents.312  In Amgen, the 
Federal Circuit used a heightened enablement standard to prevent 
the patentee from claiming all DNA sequences coding for EPO 
analogs.313  In Eli Lilly and Fiers, the Federal Circuit raised the bar for 
written description to prevent applicants from demonstrating 
 
 303 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562. 
 304 Complementary DNA (cDNA) is DNA that is synthesized using mRNA as a 
template.  See BECKER ET AL., supra note 27, at 525-26.  Through this process, known as 
reverse transcription, scientists can isolate the original gene minus its non-coding 
regions.  Id. 
 305 See Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1567-69. 
 306 Id. at 1566-69. 
 307 Id. at 1567. 
 308 Id. at 1566-69. 
 309 Id. at 1567. 
 310 See id. 
 311 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 312 See supra note 227. 
 313 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214. 
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possession of the claimed invention until they could describe the 
exact DNA sequence.314  If adopted, a biotechnology-specific, 
foreseeability-based limitation on the doctrine of equivalents will 
further prevent inventors from broadening claims to DNA-based 
patents. 
As things currently stand after Festo,315 inventors seeking to patent 
gene-based inventions face two major hurdles: prosecution history 
estoppel316 and the elevated standards of written description and 
enablement.317  That is, patent applicants wish to protect their 
inventions by claiming all variants, i.e., analogs of the invention.318  
The heightened standards of enablement and written description, 
however, inevitably preclude broadly claiming all of the variants.319  
Further, once the enablement or written description rejection is 
made, prosecution history estoppel will prevent capturing those 
variants through the doctrine of equivalents.320  Thus, the applicant 
will be left with the literal and narrower language of the original 
claims.321 
To avoid this possibility, commentators suggest claiming an 
invention narrowly, in order to avoid prosecution history estoppel, 
and attempting to broaden the claims through the doctrine of 
equivalents.322  A foreseeability limit, however, prevents the patentee 
from employing these means to broaden gene patent scope because 
it applies to the original claims as drafted, regardless of the existence 
of prosecution history estoppel.323  Thus, once the patentee foresees a 
 
 314 See Sampson, supra note 273, at 1258-65 (offering an overview of how the 
Federal Circuit has applied a heightened standard of written description). 
 315 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722. 
 316 See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an overview of prosecution 
history estoppel. 
 317 See supra note 227. 
 318 See Arriola, supra note 204, at 944. 
 319 Id. at 944 (referring to the “all too common written description and 
enablement rejection”). 
 320 Id.  This result occurs because any amendment related to patentability gives 
rise to prosecution history estoppel.  See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722, 735-77.  Thus, once 
the patent applicant narrows his claims in response to an enablement or written 
description rejection (an amendment related to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 112), 
prosecution history estoppel prevents broadening the claims to capture the subject 
matter lost in amendment.  See supra text accompanying notes 142-48 for an 
overview of prosecution history estoppel. 
 321 See supra note 320. 
 322 See John M. Benassi & Kurt M. Kjelland, Still Not the Same as it Ever Was . . . 
Proving Infringement After the Supreme Court’s Festo Decision, 721 PLI/PAT 253, 306 
(2002); see also Arriola, supra note 204, at 945 (making this suggestion in the context 
of the complete bar announced by the Federal Circuit in Festo I). 
 323 See Bagner & Rizzi, supra note 252, at 365. 
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particular DNA sequence, protein or analog, he must draft his claims 
to include such material.324  If the applicant fails to claim this 
foreseeable subject matter, by narrowly claiming the invention with 
an eye to broadening through the doctrine of equivalents, he will fall 
prey to the foreseeability standard.325  By deliberately claiming a 
subset of possibilities, the applicant recognized and chose not to 
claim foreseeable subject matter.326  Thus, he knowingly drew the line 
and is precluded from resorting to the doctrine of equivalents to later 
capture such subject matter.327 
Further, in requiring the patentee “to draft claims that capture 
all reasonably foreseeable ways to practice the invention,”328 the 
foreseeable standard places quite a burden on the claims drafter.329  
With regard to claims to DNA sequences and their proteins, the 
patent applicant faces the formidable task of having to claim all 
objectively foreseeable variants of the sequence or protein.330  
Although Judge Rader did not provide explicit guidance as to what 
constitutes objective foreseeability, the Federal Circuit recently 
delineated such a standard in its latest Festo pronouncement, on 
remand from the Supreme Court.331  According to the court, 
objective foreseeability is determined from the perspective of one 
skilled in the art.332  The Federal Circuit further expounded that if an 
equivalent is known in the relevant prior art, “it certainly [should] be 
foreseeable.”333 
 
 324 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring) 
(noting that “when one of ordinary skill in the art would foresee coverage of an 
invention, a patent drafter has an obligation to claim those foreseeable limits”). 
 325 See id. at 1058 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting Sage Prods., 126 F.3d 1420 (“As 
between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but 
did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its 
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”)). 
 326 See James Pooley & Marc David Peter, Proof of Equivalence After Festo: The Impact 
of Foresight, 725 PLI/PAT 101, 107 (2002) (examining the role and application of 
foresight on the doctrine of equivalents after Festo). 
 327 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) 
(noting “the doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent 
drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application process and included 
in the claims”). 
 328 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 329 See id. (noting the premium that the foreseeability standard places on claims 
drafting). 
 330 See id. (noting the “objective standard” set by foreseeability). 
 331 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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In patent law, the person of ordinary skill in the art possesses 
knowledge of every relevant prior art reference.334  Thus, gene patent 
applicants face an uphill battle when arguing that the subject matter 
they failed to claim was objectively unforeseeable.  Under the Federal 
Circuit’s most recent foreseeability analysis in Festo, subject matter is 
likely objectively foreseeable if it exists in the relevant prior art.335  
Thus, applicants who fail to claim a sequence, protein or variant 
either deliberately, by mistake or because it was unknown to them at 
the time of invention, each a real possibility given the breadth of 
biotechnology prior art,336 may very well be precluded from arguing 
that the material was unforeseeable and thus reachable by the 
doctrine of equivalents.337 
D. The “Premium”338 that the Foreseeability Approach Places on Notice 
will Serve to Further Spur Biotechnological Innovation 
The doctrine of equivalents, while allowing patentees to bring 
non-literal infringement claims, also creates a level of uncertainty 
among competitors.339  Given that “claims, like the words with which 
they are written, are inherently imprecise,”340 competitors can never 
be sure whether their activities are safe from infringement suits 
under the doctrine of equivalents.341  This leads to increased risk and 
decreased incentives to invent technologies that may infringe the 
outer, undefined boundary of other patent claims.342  Arguably, such 
uncertainty is further magnified in biotechnology, a field 
characterized by a proliferation of intellectual property rights 
 
 334 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 220, at 1188 (citing In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 
1017 (C.C.P.A. 1966)). 
 335 Festo, 344 F.3d at 1369 (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc., 330 F.3d at 1357). 
 336 See Arriola, supra note 273, at 942-43 (noting that “[m]any molecular 
manipulations involved in the quest for scientific discoveries, although scientifically 
complex, are something more akin to routine testing in the field,” and that “it is no 
longer a novel concept for scientists to ‘design’ functional equivalents”); see also 
Fellmeth & Demaine, supra note 149, at 306 (commenting how technologies such as 
gene cloning, computer controlled sequencing machines, and polymerase chain 
reactions have significantly increased scientists’ ability to rapidly locate and sequence 
commercially valuable genes). 
 337 See Bagner & Rizzi, supra note 252, at 305. 
 338 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring) 
(noting that the foreseeability standard places a “premium on notice”). 
 339 See Sandonato & Wischhusen, supra note 143, at A19. 
 340 Id. 
 341 See Mathew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1045, 1058 (2001) (arguing for a foreseeable approach to prosecution history 
estoppel). 
 342 Id. 
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regarding the fundamental biochemicals needed for research.343 
Under a foreseeability limit on the doctrine of equivalents, 
which disallows equivalence for objectively foreseeable yet unclaimed 
subject matter, the claims become “the sole definition of invention 
scope in all foreseeable circumstances.”344  Thus, competitors in the 
biotechnology industry need only consult the claims for reliable 
guidance regarding what does and does not infringe the patent.345  In 
providing clearer boundaries regarding infringement, the 
foreseeability standard eliminates some of the risks associated with 
new product development in this age of intellectual property right 
proliferation.346  Hopefully, this decreased level of risk will translate to 
increased incentives to develop innovative technologies. 
Further, although the foreseeability standard makes claims “the 
sole definition of invention scope,” it does not harm the patentee by 
providing competitors with a “blueprint” for avoiding infringement.347  
As noted by various commentators, “[w]here foreseeability is found, 
the patentee is deemed to have intended to abandon that particular 
equivalent, and thus neither patent law nor equity is offended by the 
competitor’s use of the equivalent subject matter . . . .”348 
CONCLUSION 
Advances in molecular biology, genomics, and proteomics will 
continue to spawn new drugs, therapeutics and other 
biotechnological innovations that change the way humans encounter 
life.349  In order to maintain this era of biotechnological innovation, 
the USPTO and Federal Circuit must remain mindful of the harm 
that broad gene patents may have on biotechnology, health care and 
biomedical research.350  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit and USPTO 
must continue to limit claims to gene-based inventions.  Already, the 
Federal Circuit has raised the bar of patentability for biotechnology 
 
 343 See supra text accompanying notes 162-71 for a discussion of biotechnology 
patent proliferation and the manner in which such blocking patents threaten to 
impede scientific progress. 
 344 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 345 See id. 
 346 Mathew J. Conigliaro et al., supra note 341, at 1071. 
 347 Id. (addressing this concern with regard to a foreseeability approach to 
prosecution history estoppel). 
 348 Id. 
 349 See supra Part II for an overview of the biotechnology industry and its current 
scientific focus. 
 350 See supra Part IV for an analysis of the detrimental effects of broad gene 
patents. 
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patents through heightened standards of enablement and written 
description.351  The Federal Circuit should further act to prevent 
broad gene-based patents by adopting a biotech-specific, 
foreseeability-based limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.352  
Through superior notice and decreased opportunities to broaden 
claims beyond their literal meaning, the foreseeability limit could 
prove an effective patent law mechanism for preventing broad gene 
patents and promoting biotechnological progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 351 See supra note 227 and Part V.B for an analysis of Federal Circuit case law 
elevating the enablement and written description requirements for biotechnology 
patent cases. 
 352 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
